In this paper we provide experimental evidence indicating that incentive contracts may cause a strong crowding out of reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation. This crowding out effect constitutes costs of incentive provision that have been largely neglected by economists. In our experiments the crowding out effect is so strong that the incentive contracts are less efficient than contracts without any incentives. Principals, nonetheless, prefer the incentive contracts because they allow them to appropriate a much larger share of the (smaller) total surplus and are, hence, more profitable for them.
INTRODUCTION
Economic theories rely almost always in some way on the effectiveness of material incentives. From the economist's viewpoint the question why certain actions are undertaken is closely related to the question which incentives the decision-makers face. There can thus be little doubt that the effectiveness and the limits of material incentives belong to the fundamental questions in economics. In this paper we examine experimentally how principals in a principal-agent relationship use the available incentives and to what extent the provision of material incentives crowds out the agents' propensity to cooperate voluntarily.
Our results show that material incentives may indeed cause a strong crowding out of voluntary cooperation. In our experiments the crowding out is so strong that those contracts, which provide explicit material incentives, are on average less efficient, i.e., they elicit less effort from the agents, than contracts that do not provide any incentives at all. This result is obtained although the standard economic model predicts that the incentive contract will be much more efficient than the contract without incentives. 1 Despite the efficiency loss principals have a material advantage from the provision of incentives because the incentive contracts allow them to reap a much larger share from the smaller surplus. Thus, the redistributive effect of incentive contracts was sufficiently strong to over-compensate the induced efficiency loss. In our view these results are important because voluntary cooperation is important in many real world contexts. Whenever agents have discretion over the intensity or the type of activity they perform in a principal-agent relationship voluntary cooperation is very valuable for the principals. The relevance of voluntary cooperation for, e.g., the employment relation is neatly confirmed by the extensive study of Bewley (1995 Bewley ( , 2000 who reports the following: "Managers claim that workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of employers that it is not wise to depend on coercion and financial incentives alone as motivators" (Bewley 1995, p. 252 ).
In the standard principal-agent approach the agents' objective function is, in general, increasing and strictly concave in income, decreasing in effort and additively separable in the two arguments. If agents determine their effort by maximizing this objective function they do not cooperate voluntarily. If, in contrast, they work harder 1 For our purposes we define the standard economic model by two assumptions. First, individuals are fully rational and second, individuals' objective function is defined in quite a narrow way in the sense that only income and the costs of effort matter. For seminal papers on the standard approach see, e.g., Holmström (1979) , Grossman and Hart (1983) , Hart and Holmström (1987) and Jewitt (1988) . Interesting overviews about the empirical evidence are provided in Gibbons (1997) and Prendergast (1999). we speak of voluntary cooperation. Voluntary cooperation may have different sources:
Agents may be simply irrational or they may have an intrinsic preference for the activity. Agents may also feel an obligation to work hard and exhibit loyalty because the principal has been treating them well. Another possibility is that agents may want to gain the social approval of relevant reference agents by providing excess effort relative to their narrow material self-interest. The neglect of these sources of voluntary cooperation in the standard approach is no big problem as long as these factors do not interact in important ways with the incentives provided. 2 There is a large literature in social psychology (and a growing one in economics) which suggests that there may be important interaction effects. This literature claims that material rewards for a pleasant activity may decrease the intrinsic motivation to perform this activity (see, e.g. Deci and Ryan 1985) .
3 Frey (1993) and in particular Frey (1997) discuss the relevance of this literature to economics. Recently, the empirical claims put forward in this literature have been called into question (see, e.g., Eisenberger and Cameron 1996, and Kunz and Pfaff 1998) . 4 Our experiment differs, however, in important ways from the typical experiment conducted by the psychologists who are interested in the crowding out of intrinsic motivation for pleasant activities. In particular, in our experiment the agents' tasks are not intrinsically pleasurable and can, hence, be no source for the agents' voluntary cooperation. Instead, voluntary cooperation is always costly for the agents. It prevails because sufficiently many agents respond to generous contract offers with a generous effort level, i.e., the agents' reciprocity gives rise to voluntary cooperation. Our results
show that explicit material incentives may have "hidden" costs because they may crowd out reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will describe the experimental design and the experimental procedures. In Section 3 we derive the behavioral predictions. Section 4 presents the results. In Section 5 we summarize our findings and provide a concluding discussion. 2 Occasionally voluntary cooperation has been taken into account. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) assume, e.g., that employee's are willing to provide positive effort levels in the absence of any material incentives. This is a critical assumption for their conclusion that in a multi-tasking environment principals may do better if agents face no incentives at all. 3 Recently, Bénabou and Tirole (1999) developed a model that neatly formalises the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic incentives. 4 For a response to the critique of Eisenberger and Cameron see Deci, Koestner and Ryan (forthcoming).
THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
The basic feature of our design is the comparison of two treatments in the context of a "gift exchange game" as developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) . The first treatment, which forms the baseline, is the so-called "Trust-Treatment" (henceforth TT). Its main purpose is to establish the extent of voluntary cooperation in the absence of material incentives for cooperation. The second treatment is the "IncentiveTreatment" (henceforth IT). It is the same as the TT, except that material incentives for contractual compliance are introduced. We will first describe the treatments and then the common procedural details. In the next section we will discuss the behavioral hypotheses that are relevant for our examination.
The Trust-Treatment
The constituent game was a version of the "gift exchange game", which comprises three stages. In the first stage principals make a contract offer, which consists of a fixed wage w and a desired effort level ê. Upon acceptance at the second stage, agents have to decide on an actual effort level e at the third stage. They are not committed by the principal's desired effort level ê, i.e., the can choose e ≠ ê. In the experiments, a principal's profit is given by:
ve is the return for the principal as a function of the agent's actual effort e. In the experiments v = 100 and wages w have to obey 0 ≤ w ≤ 100. Actual and desired effort levels have to be elements of the set {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1}.
The agent's payoff in the experiment is given by w -c(e) if the contract is accepted; (2) u = 0 if no contract is concluded.
Effort e causes disutility c(e). In the experiments c(e) was determined according to 
The Incentive-Treatment
The basic difference between the IT and the TT is that in the IT principals have the possibility to punish agents whose effort choice falls short of ê, provided the agent's shirking can be verified. In particular, principals' contract offers in the IT also specify -in addition to w and ê -a fine f that has to be paid to the principal in case that e < ê can be verified. Verification of shirking happens with probability 0 < s < 1. With probability 1 -s shirking cannot be verified and, hence, the principal is committed to pay w. Therefore, a principal's (expected) payoff in the IT is ve -w if the contract is accepted and e ≥ ê;
(3) π = ve -w + sf if the contract is accepted and e < ê; 0 if no contract is concluded.
An agent who does not shirk earns the contractually agreed-upon wage and has to bear the effort costs, i.e. her utility is w -c(e). This is also the utility in case of unverifiable shirking. In case of verifiable shirking the wage is reduced by the fine f. Therefore, an agent's (expected) payoff is given by w -c(e) if the contract is accepted and e ≥ ê (4) u = w -c(e) -sf if the contract is accepted and e < ê. 0 if no contract is concluded.
In the experiment the probability with which shirking could be verified was s = 1/3.
The fine had to obey the restriction 0 ≤ f ≤ 13.
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All other parameters and restrictions 5 In reality there are often limits to principals' sanctioning possibilities. Some of these limitations are due to legal regulations, norms, or collective bargaining agreements. It is also possible that these limits arise endogenously because the monitoring technology is not perfect or if there is a problem of "moral were the same as in the TT. In both treatments all players knew their own payoff function and the payoff function of the trading partners, i.e., v, c(e) as given in Table   1 , s and the feasible values of w and f were known by all players.
Procedures and common features
After their arrival all subjects were randomly allocated to their roles as principals and agents, respectively. All subjects kept their role during the whole experiment. A subject only participated in one treatment. The experiments were manually conducted.
After subjects were assigned to their role, agents and principals had to go in two different, yet adjacent rooms where they sat remote from each other. Subjects first had to read their instructions (see Appendix) and then they had to answer a set of control questions to test their understanding of payoff calculations. The experiments only started after all subjects gave correct answers to all questions.
In both treatments there were six subjects in the role of a "principal" and eight subjects in the role of an "agent". At the beginning principals first had to decide privately on a contract offer by entering it into a decision sheet. In the IT, after principals had made their choice, they had to roll a six-sided die, which determined whether shirking, in case it occurred, could be verified. In particular, if the numbers 1 and 2 turned up, the agent's effort choice could be verified, i.e., in case of shirking the principal could collect her specified fine f. If a number between 3 to 6 turned up, shirking was not verifiable. After all principals had made their choice (and in the IT rolled the die) all contract offers were made public by writing them on the blackboard in the principals' room. Then the principals' contract offers were transmitted to the agents' room, where they were also written on the blackboard. The agents could then choose -in a random order -among the available contract offers. Each principal could only employ one agent and each agent could only accept one job. Hence, there was an excess supply of agents, which created strong competitive pressure among the agents. Both principals and agents knew the exact number of players on each side of the market. The reason for this was that we wanted to prevent that principals offer high wages simply because they fear the rejection of their offers.
Agents who accepted a contract had to determine their actual effort level. They had to insert their choice into a decision sheet. In the IT they had to make this decision before knowing whether their effort choice can be verified, or not. However, hazard" on the principals' side. In addition, agents may also face liquidity constraints that prohibit large fines.
immediately after they have made their choice they were privately informed about verification, i.e., whether they had to pay the fine in case of shirking. 6 After an agent had determined her effort choice, the experimenter informed the principal (and nobody else) with whom the agent was matched about the actual effort level. Thus effort levels were private information of the two parties involved in a trade. This rules out any group effects regarding the choice of effort levels. At the end of the third stage principals and agents had to calculate their payoffs according to (1) and (2), and (3) and (4), respectively. After payoffs were calculated a new market was opened. To allow for learning and to test the robustness of decisions, we had twelve periods (called "trading days") in which the above-described market was operative. This was common knowledge among all players in the market.
In the experiment we avoided possible "value-laden" terms and spoke of a "buyer-seller"-relationship. Wages were called "prices"; effort was termed "quality", and the fine was described in a neutral way as a "potential price deduction". See the instructions in the Appendix for further details on framing.
Before we put forward our behavioral predictions we want to stress that our experimental procedures ensured that nobody was ever informed about the identity of their trading partners. Thus, a player who concluded a contract only knew that this contract was concluded with somebody on the other side of the market. Players did not know the identification numbers of their trading partners nor did they know their current trading partner's past behavior. It was thus completely impossible for a player to gain an individual reputation. 7 Note also that principals could not make offers to specific agents. They only could make offers to the market, i.e., the whole group of agents, and then individual agents could accept one of the available offers in a random order. Thus, even if agents would have had the opportunity to gain an individual reputation for, e.g., being a good performer, it would have been impossible for them to gain from this reputation because it was impossible for the players to select their trading partners. All these experimental procedures were implemented to enhance the one-shot nature of a trading day. 6 We also informed the non-shirkers whether they would have had to pay the fine if they had shirked. This was done to enhance the credibility of our random verification procedure. Technically, agents were informed about verification by checking the appropriate box on their decision sheets (see instructions in the Appendix). Thus, since all agents were informed about verification they could not identify the shirkers among them. 7 In this regard it is also important that the offers were written on the blackboard in a random order. We implemented a random order to prevent possible identification of principals. Therefore, it was not possible that individual principals could gain a reputation for particular offers.
BEHAVIORAL PREDICTIONS

Behavior in the TT
Due to the one-shot nature of our game, a rational agent whose preferences are given by (2) will always choose the minimal effort e min because higher effort levels are costly and yield no return for the agent. Consequently, the principal will try to pay the minimal wage that is necessary to induce the agent to accept the contract, i.e., the principal pays w min = 1.
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Since there is an excess supply of agents, principals are on the short side of the market and are, hence, able to enforce this.
However, the situation changes substantially if sufficiently many agents have a propensity to respond reciprocally to contract offers. We call a person reciprocal if she responds to actions that are perceived as hostile, e.g., to an unfair contract offer, in a hostile manner while she responds to actions that are perceived as kind in a kind manner. In the context of our TT, reciprocity means that the agent is willing to reward a generous contract offer by choosing a high effort, although this is costly and yields no material benefits for the agent. In this case, principals should be able to positively influence an agent's effort choice by paying a "generous" wage w > w min . In our experiment a contract (w, ê) is the more generous the higher the offered rent r ≡ wc(ê) for the agent is, i.e., the more the agent gets paid in excess of the effort costs implied by the desired effort level ê. In contrast to a selfish agent, a reciprocal agent will also be willing to increase her effort level in response to increases in r. Provided sufficiently many agents respond reciprocally, it pays for the principal to trust the agents by offering them a contract with r > r min ≡ 1. Hence, reciprocity can induce efficiency-enhancing voluntary cooperation.
This claim can be derived rigorously from recently developed models of equity and reciprocity (see e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998; forthcoming) , Falk and Fischbacher (1998) , Bolton und Ockenfels (forthcoming), and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) ).
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In the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , e.g., the principal can elicit 8 Wage offers had to be integers. Therefore, if agents have selfish preferences a wage offer of 1 can be an equilibrium outcome. Of course, wage offers of zero can also be an equilibrium outcome. In the following we always concentrate on the strict equilibrium in which agents are strictly better off when they accept the contract. 9 These models formalize reciprocity as a preference phenomenon. We are aware of the fact that some researchers (e.g., Binmore and Samuelson 1994) prefer to interpret the reciprocal behavior observed in many laboratory experiments as a kind of bounded rationality. In their view experimental subjects behave reciprocally because reciprocity is a habit that evolved in repeated game settings in real life. We would like to emphasize that this paper is not a contribution to this debate. Previous experimental research in the framework of the gift exchange game (and related games) strongly rejects the Selfishness Hypothesis in favor of the Reciprocity Hypothesis. A typical finding in these experiments is that in addition to the purely self-interested agents there is a large fraction of agents who -instead of setting e = e min as predicted by standard theory -choose effort levels that depend positively on the rents offered by the principal. Despite the presence of a non-negligible fraction of purely self-interested agents all experiments with the gift exchange game find a 10 A simple example illustrates the argument. Assume that an agent wants to maintain perfect equality in payoffs, i.e., he chooses e such that ve -c(e) = w -c(e). Assume further, for convenience, that c(e) = αe with 0 < α < v. Thus, if a principal wants to induce e = ê, he has to pay w = (ê/2)(v + α). Inserting this into the definition of r yields r = (ê/2)(v -α) > 0. Thus, r increases with ê.
statistically highly significant positive wage-effort relationship.
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This was first shown by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) and has since been replicated several times. It holds under conditions with a rather high stake level (Fehr and Tougareva 1996) as well as in very competitive double auction markets . 12 Previous research has also shown that there is a strong positive correlation between desired effort levels and offered rents (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997) . The observation of reciprocal behavior is not restricted to the gift exchange game. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) , Jacobsen and Sadrieh (1996) and Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000) observe reciprocity in the "investment game". Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (forthcoming)
report both "positive" and "negative" reciprocity in their "moonlighting game".
McCabe, Smith (1996, 1998) find reciprocity in specifically designed extensive form games. Güth, Klose, Königstein and Schwalbach (1998) and Anderhub, Gächter and Königstein (1999) find reciprocal behavior in "principal-agent
These results all suggest that there is a critical mass of reciprocal agents that may, on average, render trust profitable: Under conditions where only trust contracts are feasible, principals can elicit considerable efficiency-enhancing "voluntary cooperation" in the form of above-minimum effort choices, provided they offer generous contracts.
Behavior in the IT
A necessary condition for the acceptance of an incentive compatible contract in the IT is that the "participation constraint"
holds. According to (5) the agent has to be compensated in any case for the disutility of effort that arises if the agent actually chooses e = ê. A risk-neutral agent who is rational and selfish will -provided (5) holds -perform at the desired effort level (i.e., e = ê) if the No-Shirking Condition (NSC) 11 Typically between 40 and 60 percent of the agents exhibit reciprocal responses in these experiments. At the aggregate level this causes a strongly positive wage-effort relation. 12 In Fehr and Tougareva (1996) subjects earned, on average, the monetary income of ten weeks in a gift exchange experiment similar to the one presented in this paper. Further papers that report reciprocity in (versions of) the gift exchange experiment include Charness (1996); Hannan, Kagel and Moser (1999) ; Van der Heijden, Nelissen, Potters and Verbon (1998); and Falk, Gächter and Kovács (1999) . Although these experiments were conducted in many different countries and with different subject pools the results are qualitatively were similar.
is satisfied. 13 The agent will perform at the desired level if the expected fine sf in case of shirking is larger than the costs of contractual compliance, which are given by c(ê) Table 1 ). It is easy to check that with our parameterization of s = 1/3 and f ≤ 13 effort costs of 4.33 can be enforced. Hence, according to the effort cost function in Table 1 , the largest effort level that can be enforced by an incentive compatible contract, which we denote by ê*, is given by ê* = 0.4. More generally, the best reply effort choice e* of a risk-neutral agent who is rational and selfish is given by:
Since the marginal revenue of effort is 10 while the marginal cost of effort is always strictly below 10, a profit-maximizing principal who keeps the agent at her reservation utility, will always prefer the highest enforceable effort level ê* = 0. 14 The standard hypothesis assumes that all agents behave as if they are completely selfinterested and rational. If the behavior of the agents in the incentive treatment confirms the standard hypothesis, e -e* will be zero, i.e., there will be no voluntary cooperation. Moreover, agents' behavior will then not respond to variations in the rent offered so that it is not possible to induce positive voluntary cooperation (e -e* > 0)
by offering a generous rent. In addition, self-interested agents also will not reduce their effort below e* in response to low rents. Therefore, if agents in the IT behave in 13 We assume that subjects in our experiment are risk neutral because, as Rabin (1997) has shown, assuming risk aversion over the typical stake level in laboratory experiments is highly implausible. Even small degrees of risk aversion over the typical experimental stakes imply an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes. 14 There is another, non-strict subgame perfect equilibrium, in which w = 4, f = 13, ê* = 0.4 holds and where the agent accepts the contract and chooses e* = 0.4. For empirical purposes the slight difference between these two equilibria is negligible.
a completely self-interested way, we also should not observe any correlation between ê and offered rents. Firms simply have no reason to pay a rent. The situation is again substantially different if we take into account the presence of reciprocal agents. Reciprocal agents will not be willing to accept rents close to zero without retaliation because low rent offers are likely to be perceived as unfair. In the IT agents can retaliate by choosing effort levels below the best reply level e* in case that e* > e min . For the contracts predicted by the standard hypothesis retaliation is in fact very cheap because the NSC is "binding", i.e., the agent is nearly indifferent between working and complete shirking. 15 Note that the low expected costs of shirking are not simply an artifact of our experimental design but an inherent feature of the incentive compatibility requirement. Any binding incentive compatibility condition has the consequence that shirking is cheap. By raising the rent level principals can induce reciprocal agents to decrease the under-performance (e -e* < 0).
This can again be easily illustrated in the context of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model. An incentive compatible contract offer with e* > e min and a rent of zero causes inequality in favor of the principal if agents choose e = e*. Since an inequity-averse agent dislikes being materially worse off than the principal, he has an incentive to reduce the inequality. He can do this by shirking because shirking reduces the principal's monetary payoff by more than his own (expected) monetary payoff.
However, the presence of reciprocal agents may not only cause under-performance in the IT, it may also cause positive voluntary cooperation (e -e* > 0) if principals raise the offered rents sufficiently. Note that, as in the TT, the presence of reciprocal agents provides incentives for the principals to offer generous rents and to increase offered rents with increases in the desired effort. One psychological reason for the removal of voluntary cooperation in the IT may be that reciprocity requires trust to be effective. The threat of a punishment in our incentive contracts may be perceived as being incompatible with such trust. On the contrary, a contractually determined fine is likely to express suspicion, which may "crowd out" reciprocity. In addition, while the "psychological message" of a generous contract in the TT is consistent, one may argue that this is not the case in the IT. The principal in the TT who offers a generous rent and desires a high effort basically conveys the following message: "I have offered you a generous contract. Please respond with a generous effort level". This is an appeal to cooperate voluntarily. In contrast, the psychological message of a generous non-incentive compatible contract in the IT is: "I have offered you a generous contract. Please respond with a generous effort level. However, if you do not reward my generosity, I will punish you". It seems to us that agents may well perceive this message as "psychologically contradictory" because the appeal to the "good will" of the agent is destroyed by the punishment threat. In metaphorical terms, the "stick" may destroy the effectiveness of the "carrot".
In view of these arguments we put forward the following hypothesis regarding the 
RESULTS
The experiments were conducted at the University of Zurich in November and December 1997. In total 126 undergraduates from universities in Zurich participated in our experiments. All participants were recruited from a large database to minimize the likelihood that they know each other. 16 We conducted nine sessions with 8 principals and 6 agents each. In the IT we ran four and in the TT five sessions. To allow for learning and to be able to test for the stability of our results, we made it common knowledge that there will be twelve "trading days" as described above.
In the TT principals offered in total 357 contracts, of which all but one were accepted. In the IT the total number of offered contracts was 287 and 7 of them (2.4 percent) were rejected. In principle, losses were possible in these experiments.
Therefore, we endowed all subjects with an additional amount of 9 Swiss Francs. All losses had to be covered by this endowment and the earnings made during the experiments. Subjects were paid in cash immediately after the experiments. An experiment lasted between 2 and 2.5 hours. Subjects earned on average 50 Swiss Francs (about $36) including a show-up fee of 15 Swiss Francs.
Before we provide a detailed statistical analysis of our hypotheses we present the evidence at a more descriptive level. Our first result provides insights into the average contract offered by the principals in the TT and the IT. Support for R1 is provided in Table 2 and Figure 1a . Table 2 summarizes the average behavior over all periods in the IT and the TT and compares them with the standard hypothesis for both treatments. It shows that the average wage and the average rent offered in the TT are considerably higher than in the IT. The same regularity is exhibited by median wages and median rents. The median wage (rent) is more than two times larger in the TT than in the IT. Table 2 also provides information on the average and median fines. Note that the median fine is exactly the maximal fine of f = 13. In fact, principals in the IT imposed the maximum fine in 69 percent of all cases and only in 4 contracts they chose f = 0. It is, therefore, not surprising that the average fine is close to the maximal fine. With regard to the effort demanded Table 2 indicates that ê is considerably larger in the TT. On average, ê = 0.65 in the TT while principals desire only ê = 0.49 in the IT. This is also confirmed by Figure 1a , which shows the distribution of ê in both treatments. The figure indicates that the whole distribution in the TT is shifted to the right compared to the distribution of ê in the IT. This is confirmed by the nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for differences in distributions (p < 0.001).
From Figure 1a we can also infer that the majority of contract offers in the IT is not incentive compatible. The figure illustrates that more than 50 percent of all contracts in the IT demand effort levels above the maximal enforceable level of ê = 0.4. In fact, 54 percent of all contracts in the IT demand effort levels above 0.4. A further remarkable fact in Figure 1a is that the mode of ê is exactly 0.4, the value predicted by the standard hypothesis.
The frequent use of maximal fines together with the considerably lower wages in the IT convey the impression that principals in the IT relied to a large extent on the "stick" and much less on the "carrot" compared to the TT. It is, therefore interesting to see the consequences of this strategy for actual effort levels. Table 2 , which shows that the median and the mean of the actual effort level are lower in the IT. Further support for R2 is provided by Figure 1b , which presents the distributions of actual effort levels. It shows that the distribution of effort has considerably more mass at lower levels in the IT. This is also confirmed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test (p < 0.001). In particular, in the IT only 7.5 percent of effort levels are above 0.5, whereas in the TT effort levels above 0.5 account for about 27 percent of all effort choices. The distribution of effort choices in the IT shows two peaks -one at the effort level 0.1 and the other at 0.4. This is interesting since these two levels are the best replies according to the standard hypothesis described in (7) . Note also that best reply effort levels can only lie between 0.1 and 0.4 in the IT. It is remarkable that 85 percent of the effort choices actually are in this range (and, hence, can possibly be best replies). In the TT the only best reply effort level is e* = 0.1. Less than a third of the effort choices in the TT comply with this prediction. Note: Entries are number of cases in the respective category. e* denotes the best reply effort choice according to (7) .
The first interesting result in Table 3 More generally, it is remarkable that agents in the IT chose a best reply in 196 out of 280 cases (i.e., in 70 percent). In the TT only 31.5 percent of the effort choices were best replies. This difference is highly significant according to a test of proportions (z = -9.65, p < 0.001). This holds despite the fact that in the IT it is cognitively more complex to determine e* than in the TT.
In view of R2 it is interesting to know to what extent the crowding out of voluntary cooperation reduces the total surplus S, defined as the total material payoffs from a contract, in the IT relative to the TT. Before we present this result it is worthwhile to emphasize that the standard hypotheses for the TT and the IT imply that S is more than two times higher in the IT. However, in stark contrast to this hypothesis we can report the following result:
Result 3: The total surplus S is on average higher in the TT than in the IT. This holds irrespective of whether we compare the TT-contracts with incentive compatible or with non-incentive compatible IT-contracts. The profit for the principals is highest for incentive compatible contracts, second highest for TT-contracts and lowest for nonincentive compatible IT-contracts.
R3 basically means that the incentive opportunities in the IT allow principals to increase their profits relative to the TT but that this is associated with an efficiency loss. Support for R3 is presented in Table 4 , which compares the actual and the predicted surplus and shows principals' and agents' average profits from a contract.
Note, first that in the TT the realized surplus equals 33 while it is only 21.5 for nonincentive compatible contracts and 27.5 for incentive compatible contracts. Thus, relative to the surplus predicted by the standard hypothesis for the TT we observe a more efficient outcome in the TT that is due to agents' voluntary cooperation.
Although to a lesser extent this is also true for those IT-contracts that are not incentive compatible. However, actual efficiency is lower than the predicted efficiency for incentive compatible contracts. In our view R2 and R3 are quite remarkable because they indicate that in the absence of incentives the outcome may well be more efficient than predicted by the standard approach while the use of incentives may trigger factors that decrease efficiency relative to the standard prediction. Taken together this may render the complete absence of incentives, like in our TT, more efficient. It is, therefore, quite important to better understand the behavioral forces behind R2 and R3. From R1 we already know that principals in the IT are considerably less generous than principals in the TT. This suggests the possibility that the driving force behind R2 and R3 is given by principals' reluctance to make generous offers in the IT. Perhaps, the possibility of fining agents in the IT has seduced principals to use only the "stick" and to forget about eliciting effort by the "carrot" of generous offers. The principals' generosity can be measured by examining how much rent they offered at any given desired effort level. The higher the rent offered at a given desired effort, the higher is the offered share of the surplus for the agent. If principals in the IT offered lower rents for given levels of the desired effort we would have an indication that they were less generous. Moreover, if agents responded to this decrease in principals' generosity with a lower effort level we would have an explanation for the lower efficiency in the IT.
A different possibility is, however, that the driving force for the lower efficiency in the IT is not the lack of principals' generosity but the lack of agents' willingness to respond reciprocally to generous offers in the IT. Perhaps it was not possible for the principals to increase voluntary cooperation in the IT by offering more generous rents because the threat of fining agents for malfeasance created a hostile atmosphere in which agents' propensity to cooperate voluntarily was severely weakened. In this case the payment of low rents in the IT would be better interpreted as the principals' response to the agents' unwillingness to provide sufficient effort increases in response to rent increases. To examine these two possibilities in more detail we look first at the principals' generosity.
Result 4: On average, principals in the IT did not offer lower rents at given desired effort levels. Both in the IT and in the TT principals increased the offered rent if they demanded higher effort levels.
R4 provides support for those part of the reciprocity hypotheses in the IT and the TT that is related to the principals' behavior. The fact that principals in both treatments offered higher rents when they demanded higher effort levels can be interpreted as an appeal to the agents' reciprocity. Support for R4 is given in Figure 2 and in Table 5 . ) with the desired effort ê. ê it TT denotes the interaction between the TT and the desired effort. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1-, 5-and 10-percent level, respectively.
For our purposes the following results in Table 5 deserve mentioning: First, α 2 is significantly positive and rather high which indicates that incentive compatible contracts in the IT offered considerably higher rents at low desired effort levels than comparable contracts in the TT. Second, both TT-contracts and non-incentive compatible IT-contracts offer steep rent increases for higher demanded effort levels, which is indicated by the fact that α 3 and α 4 are significantly positive and relatively high. Moreover, although α 3 is bigger than α 4 , it is not significantly different from α 4 . This is due to the relatively high standard error for α 4 . Moreover, the intercept for non-incentive compatible IT-contracts, α 1 , is also not significantly different from the intercept α 0 in the TT. This confirms that non-incentive compatible contracts in the IT were, in general, also not less generous than contracts in the TT. As a consequence, the lower overall effort levels in the IT cannot be attributed to less generosity by the principals. In the next step we examine, therefore, agents' effort behavior in more detail.
Result 5: Agents' average effort in the TT exhibits a strong positive correlation with the offered rent level. In the IT there is no such relationship.
Before we present the evidence in favor of R5 it is noteworthy that R4 and R5 together reject the standard hypothesis and confirm the reciprocity hypothesis for the TT. Figure 3 
Intervals of offered rents Average actual effort
IT TT Profit-maximizing principals are interested in the total effort they can elicit at the different rent levels. Figure 3 is informative about the material incentives for the principals to pay generous rents. However, the figure does not yield precise insights into the validity of our crowding-out hypotheses. The next result is, therefore, related to these hypotheses.
Result 6: The complete crowding out hypothesis is confirmed insofar as there is virtually no voluntary cooperation when agents face incentive compatible contracts. The partial crowding out hypothesis is confirmed because agents in the IT provide, in general, considerably less excess effort and the excess effort does not respond positively to the offered rent.
Support for R6 comes from Figure 4 and Table 6 . . Moreover, to examine the robustness of behavior over time we also divide the data into three time intervals. Note that in the TT e* = 0.1, whereas in the IT e* is determined according to (7) and can at most be 0.4. Hence, in the IT (e -e*) ∈ [-0.3, 0.9] and in the TT (e -e*) ∈ [0, 0.9]. Figure 4 neatly confirms the weak crowding-out hypothesis because it shows that excess effort is for almost all rent intervals bigger in the TT and responds more strongly to the rent level than in the IT. For example, while the excess effort is strongly positively related to the offered rent in the TT it does not respond in an obvious way for non-incentive compatible IT-contracts. For incentive compatible contracts the average excess effort is virtually never positive and in several cases even negative. These regularities are robust over time, i.e., they hold true for all three time intervals. Table 6 provides econometric evidence for R6. We report the results of the following regression separately for all three time intervals and for the whole experiment:
For the same reasons as in regression (8) we have also estimated equation (9) so that the censoring of the dependent variable is taken into account. In addition we report again the robust standard errors. In (9) β 0 measures the excess effort in the TT if principals offer no rent. β 1 measures the excess effort at zero rents for non-incentive compatible IT-contracts relative to β 0 and β 2 measures the same for incentive compatible IT-contracts. β 3 is the coefficient for the response of excess effort in the TT while β 4 and β 5 measure the excess effort response in the IT for non-incentive compatible and for incentive compatible contracts, respectively. The partial crowding out hypothesis predicts that excess effort is more responsive to rents in the TT compared to the IT, i.e., β 3 is larger than β 4 and β 5 . 
. Rejected contract offers are excluded. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1-, 5-and 10-percent level, respectively. Table 6 shows that this holds true in each time interval and, hence, also for the regression with the data from all periods. While β 3 is always positive and highly significant, β 4 is never significantly different from zero and in periods 5 -8 even negative. β 5 , the measure of the excess effort response for incentive compatible contracts, is significantly positive when the data from all periods are used. However, β 5 is much smaller than β 3 . These estimates clearly indicate that paying higher rents was profitable in the TT but not in the IT. A rent increase by 10 units increases the (excess) effort in the TT by roughly 0.13 units, i.e., the rent increase causes a revenue increase of 13. In case of non-incentive compatible contracts in the IT (excess) effort does not respond at all to the rent offered and for incentive compatible IT-contracts the excess effort response is too small to be profitable. A rent increase by 10 units in an incentive compatible contract reduces under-performance on average by roughly 0.05 effort units, which is tantamount to a revenue increase of 5 units.
We have also regressed the cost measure of voluntary cooperation, c(e) -c(e*), on the variables in equation (9) . The results of this regression are very similar to those reported in Table 6 . In the TT there is a robust positive impact of the rents on c(e) -c(e*), while no such relation exists for the non-incentive compatible IT-contracts. However, for the incentive compatible IT-contracts the results differ somewhat from those of Table 6 . When measured in cost terms, it is no longer possible to reduce the agents' under-performance by paying higher rents. This is further evidence for the claim that in the IT the agents' behavior cannot or only weakly be affected by varying rent levels.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This paper shows that reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation may indeed be crowded out by incentive contracts. Moreover, the crowding out is sufficiently strong so that incentive contracts are on average less efficient than contracts without incentives. In our context crowding out means that agents are less willing to cooperate voluntarily at the same offered rent level when the contract stipulates a fine for shirking. When the principals had the opportunity to fine agents they made on average less generous contract offers, i.e. they relied less on the "carrot" and more on the "stick". However, whenever principals demanded relatively high effort levels in the IT they offered similarly generous rents to the agents than in the TT. Therefore, it seems likely that the low overall rent offers by the principals were a response to the crowding out of voluntary cooperation in the incentive treatment.
Why did the principals persist in fining agents when this causes the crowding out of voluntary cooperation? In our view there are basically two reasons for this. First, principals earn much higher profits when they stipulate fines in an incentive compatible contract. Remember that incentive compatible IT-contracts generate a profit that is more than two times larger than the profit in the TT. This induces profitmaximizing principals to propose contracts with a fine. Second, even if principals are not selfish but care instead also for equity in the sense of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model they will prefer to fine shirking agents. This is so because shirking induces, in general, quite severe payoff inequality in favor of the agents. Since inequity averse principals strongly dislike disadvantageous inequality they will also prefer to fine shirking agents because this decreases or even removes the disadvantageous inequality. 17 A further question is why the principals in the IT proposed so many non-incentive compatible contracts. There are, in principle two candidate explanations here. The first is that it is cognitively demanding to design an incentive compatible contract and principals needed time to learn this. The second potential explanation is that principals did not anticipate the crowding out of voluntary cooperation in the IT and -as a consequence -they frequently demanded non-incentive compatible effort levels at the beginning of the experiment. The fact that non-incentive compatible desired effort levels were in general associated with generous rent offers provides support for the second explanation for it suggests that the principals tried to appeal to the agents' reciprocity. However, this does not rule out that the first explanation has also some validity.
Our experiment and our conclusions differ in several important ways from the psychological literature that aims at testing the crowding out of intrinsic motivation.
First, in these experiments subjects are engaged in an activity that is assumed to be pleasurable. Usually, the time spent on the activity in the absence of any payment for the activity is taken as an indicator of subjects intrinsic motivation. In our experiment, in contrast, voluntary cooperation is always costly for the agent. Second, in the psychological experiments it seems more difficult to judge the economic importance of the crowding out effect because the value of the activity for the principal is not modelled explicitly. This is relevant insofar as crowding out may occur but efficiency is nonetheless enhanced by incentives. Third, since principals are no players in these experiments the experimental subjects are always confronted with an exogenously set incentive. The nature and the extent of the crowding out effect may, however, also be affected by whether a certain incentive is intentionally chosen by the principal or whether the incentive is exogenously set by the experimenter. Fourth, the psychological crowding out literature claims that once a pleasurable activity has been paid, the crowding out effect is irreversible, i.e. the removal of the incentive does not re-establish the previous level of intrinsic motivation. Although we have not tested this in our context we would be very surprised if subjects in a TT who experienced an IT some time ago would not exhibit the usual degrees of voluntary cooperation.
Finally, the psychological literature claims that monetary rewards have effort-decreasing effects. We are much less confident that this holds true in our context. In fact, it may well be possible that the framing of incentives, i.e., whether the same incentive is framed as a reward or as a punishment, turns out to be crucial. If incentives are framed as a punishment they may elicit hostile responses from the agents while when they are framed as rewards they may cause friendly responses from the agents which may enhance voluntary cooperation. 18 What are the implications of our results for contract and incentive theory? Although in our view the results certainly do not mean that material incentives will, in general, impair efficiency we believe that the crowding out of voluntary cooperation is a possibility that should be taken seriously. There are by now also several other papers which convincingly show the existence of this effect. In Gneezy and Rustichini (forthcoming) it is shown that the introduction of price incentives for parents who pick up their children too late from the kindergarden increases the frequency of late-coming parents. Gneezy and Rustichini (1999) show that monetary rewards for pupils who collect money from households for social purposes may decrease the amount of money collected. Bohnet, Frey and Huck (1999) conducted a contract enforcement experiment in which the probability of fining agents for the breach of a contract is varied. It turns out that the propensity to obey the contract is non-monotonic in this probability. Fehr and Rockenbach (2000) conducted a Trust experiment with and without punishment opportunities for the principal. Their results indicate that if the principal -although he has the opportunity to punish the agent for malfeasancevoluntarily refrains from threatening to punish the agent, voluntary cooperation by the agents is enhanced. Although these results do not yet give us clear and sharp answers why and under which conditions crowding out will occur they suggest that the effect is real. Therefore, one important question for future theoretical and empirical research is which incentive schemes are capable of avoiding crowding out effects and which are not. 
APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS
Introductory Remarks (identical for buyers and sellers)
The experiment, in which you participate today, is part of a research project that is funded by various research funds. Its purpose is to study decision making in markets. Your income in this experiment consists of Fr. 15.-for your show-up and all payment that you will earn during the experiment according to your decisions and those of other participants. During the experiment your income will be calculated in points where 1 point = 8 Rappen. Calculated in points the show-up fee of Fr. 15 amounts to 187.5 points. In addition you will receive an endowment of 112.5 points, which implies that in total you will have 300 points at your disposal to cover losses that may occur during the experiment. However, with your own decisions you can always prevent losses with certainty. At the end of the experiment all points, which you earned during the experiment will be summed up, exchanged into Swiss Francs, and paid out to you in cash immediately. First we would like to ask you to read these instructions carefully, and then to answer the control questions. After all participants have correctly answered all questions, we will start with the experiment, in which you will need the 12 decision sheets and the leaflet which have been handed out to you together with these instructions. Please notice that all written information that you receive from us, is for your private use only. You are not allowed to transmit any information to other participants of this experiment. It is also prohibited to communicate with the other participants. Otherwise we would have to break off the experiment. If you have questions, please ask us.
General Information (identical for buyers and sellers)
• In this experiment there are buyers and sellers. The experiment comprises 12 trading periods.
• Each trading day consists of two stages. At the first stage each buyer decides on an offer, which contains the conditions under which the buyer is prepared to buy a commodity from a seller. Such an offer consists of a price, a desired quality and a potential price deduction. There are ten possible quality levels.
• At the second stage a random mechanism determines an order according to which the sellers can choose among the available offers. No seller is obliged to accept a bid, and no buyer is forced to make an offer. All sellers who have accepted an offer, have to decide which quality they will actually deliver. Choosing a quality level entails costs for the seller. After the seller has determined the "actual quality" the respective seller will be informed about it.
• In principle the seller can choose a quality level that is higher, equal, or lower than the desired quality. If the actual quality is lower than the desired quality, then the potential price deduction specified in the contract is due with a probability of 33.3 percent. Hence, with a lower than the desired quality, the specified price deduction is on average due in one out of three cases. The seller will only learn after his actual quality choice whether the price deduction is due or not. A trading day is over after all sellers who have accepted an offer, have determined their actual quality and all bargaining partners have been informed whether there is a price deduction.
• There are more sellers than buyers. All sellers and buyers know this. Each seller (or buyer, resp.) can only sell (buy) one unit per trading day. In the following you will find an exact description of the stages, i.e., which decisions are possible, and an exact description of how payoffs are calculated.
Detailed Information for Buyers
In the market a certain commodity is traded and each seller sells the same commodity. Each seller can sell to each buyer and each buyer can buy from each seller. The market is organized as follows. We open the market for a trading day and you will receive from us 100 points for each commodity that you buy. This amount is the same for all buyers. Each buyer and each seller knows that you will receive 100 points per unit of the commodity. You now have the possibility to make an offer. An offer consists of a price, a desired quality and a potential price deduction. For making an offer the following rules hold: 1. Per trading day you are only allowed to make one offer. You are not obliged to make an offer.
2.
Concerning the "desired quality" the following holds: There are ten possible quality levels, from which you can choose your desired quality. The lowest quality is 0.1 and the highest one is 1. Below, the impact of the seller's delivered quality on your payoff will be described in more detail. It holds true that your payoff in points is the higher the higher the delivered quality is. A quality choice entails quality costs for the seller. On the leaflet you will find the table with all feasible quality levels and the associated quality costs! All sellers have the same cost schedule. 3. The price can at most be 100 and has at least to cover the seller's quality cost. For example, if you ask for the quality level 0.3, you have to offer at least a price of 2, for a quality of 0.3 entails costs of 2 units for the seller. Prices have to be in integers. In summary, for the determination of the price the following rule holds:
100 ≥ price ≥ quality costs. 4. The potential price deduction has not to be lower than 0 and larger than 13:
13 ≥ potential price deduction ≥ 0. The potential price deduction has to be stated in integers. If you have decided on a price, a potential price deduction and a desired quality, please insert them in the box "proposed offer" on your decision sheet. After you have made your offer, you have to roll a six-sided die. Rolling the die determines whether the price deduction is due in case of an under-provision of the desired quality. The following rule hold: If the numbers 1 or 2 show up (with a probability of 1/3) the price deduction is exacted in case of an under-provision; if the numbers 3, 4, 5, or 6 show up, the price deduction will not be implemented. Please insert the result in the box "Price deduction due in case of under-provision?" on your decision sheet. Your offer will be written on the blackboard and transmitted to the sellers. In the sellers' room all offers on a trading day will be written on the blackboard in a random order. Moreover, on each trading day a random mechanism determines the order according to which sellers are allowed to choose amount the offers. The sellers will not learn which buyer has made which offer and you as a buyer will not learn which seller has accepted which offer. Each seller can only accept one offer per trading day. The sellers cannot make counteroffers.
After a seller has accepted an offer, he determines the "actual quality" of the commodity, i.e., he chooses a quality level from the quality levels mentioned on the leaflet. Hence, the sellers can choose among exactly the same quality levels as you can. As already mentioned, for the seller choosing a quality entails quality costs. When a seller determines the "actual quality" of the sold commodity, he does not know whether in case the actual quality falls short of the desired quality the price deduction will be implemented or not. Hence, the seller does not know the numbers that showed up in your throwing of the die. The seller only knows that an under-provision leads to a price deduction with a probability of 1/3. Each seller personally and completely anonymously decides on the actual quality of which only you will be informed (i.e., it will be inserted in the row "actual quality" on your decision sheet). You will not learn the identity of the seller. Hence, no other buyer and no other seller will learn about the actual quality choice of "your" seller. If the seller has made an actual quality choice that falls short of your desired quality and if the price deduction is due (i.e., if the die numbers are 1 or 2) then you only have to pay the seller the offered price minus the price deduction. If the price deduction is not due, you have to pay the offered price. You now have all necessary information to calculate your own payoff as well as the payoff of "your" seller. This ends a trading day and the next one starts. In total there will be 12 trading days during which you can earn money.
The Calculation of Buyer's Payoffs at the End of a Trading Day (for sellers this sheet was adapted accordingly but was otherwise identical)
At the end of a trading day there are the following possibilities:
1.
If you have not made an offer, or if your offer has not been accepted by a seller, you have not bought a unit and your payoff is 0 points.
2.
Your offer has been accepted and the seller's actual quality conforms to or is higher than your desired quality. In this case your payoff and the payoff of your seller is (in points):
Your payoff = 100×actual quality -price Seller's payoff = Price -quality costs
3.
Your offer has been accepted, but the seller has chosen a lower than your desired quality.
(a) The price deduction cannot be exacted, because the die numbers 3, 4, 5 or 6 showed up. In this case your payoff and the payoff of your seller is:
Your payoff = 100×actual quality -price Seller's payoff = Price -quality costs (b) The die numbers 1 and 2 showed up, i.e., the price deduction can be implemented. In this case your payoff and the payoff of your seller is: What is the payoff of "your" seller? (c) The actual quality of your seller is 0.1 and die number 3 showed up. What is your payoff?
What is the payoff of "your" seller?
Leaflet (identical for buyers and sellers)
Points for buyer per unit bought: 100 For making an offer the following rules hold: 100 ≥ price ≥ quality costs 13 ≥ potential price deduction ≥ 0 Quality and cost of quality for the seller: Buyers' decision sheet (1 per period; 12 sheets in total) (The decision sheet of sellers was adapted accordingly but was otherwise identical)
Proposed offer
Price ( 
Detailed Information for Sellers
In the market a certain commodity is traded and each seller sells the same commodity. Each seller can sell to each buyer and each buyer can buy from each seller. Each seller receives from us on each trading day 100 points, which he can use for buying a commodity. All buyers and sellers know this. The organisation of the market is as follows: We open the market for one trading day. First, without communicating with other buyers, each buyer can make an offer. An offer consists of a price, a desired quality and a potential price deduction. There are ten possible quality levels from which the buyer, and you as a seller, respectively, can choose. The lowest quality is 0.1 and the highest quality is 1. The impact of the quality of the delivered good on the payoffs will below be described in more detail. In general, however, it holds true that a high quality increases your cost and the payoff of the buyer. On the leaflet you will find a table with all possible quality levels and the associated quality costs of your quality choice. The next step after all buyers had the opportunity to make an offer, is the transmission of the offers to this room where the offers will be written on the blackboard in a random order. You will not learn which buyer made which offer. Now a random device determines the order according to which you as a seller can choose among the offers. We implement this as follows. You have to draw one out of 8 cards that are numbered from 1 to 8. The seller who picks card no. 1 is the first who has the opportunity to pick an offer; the seller who draws card no. 2 is the second to pick an offer, and so on. You will make your choice as follows:
When it is your turn to make a choice, you state your seller number and your chosen offer.
On a trading day you can accept only one offer. You are not obliged to accept an offer. The buyers will not be informed which offer you have accepted; the buyer will only know, whether their offer has been accepted or not. Your chosen offer will be deleted from the blackboard and it is the turn of the next seller to make a choice among the remaining offers. If you have accepted an offer, we ask you to insert on your decision sheet the price, the desired quality and the potential price deduction into the box "Accepted Offer". Now you have to decide which quality level you will deliver. As already mentioned, the choice of a quality level is associated with quality costs that you have to bear. On the leaflet you will find the table with the feasible quality levels and the associated costs for you! Both the buyers and the sellers know this table. Please insert your actual quality level on your decision sheet in the row "Actual Quality". No other seller will be informed about your quality choice. We therefore ask you not to talk about your "actual quality". Each buyer is only informed about the "actual quality" of "his" seller. Moreover, the buyer will not learn the identity of "his" seller. Hence, the anonymity of your quality choice is completely secured.
Whether the potential price deduction is due or not, depends on your quality choice and on chance. If you have delivered or exceeded the desired quality you will receive the accepted price in any case and the price deduction is not exacted. If, however, your actual quality fell short of the desired quality, the price deduction may be implemented. Whether the price deduction is due, depends on the result of the following procedure: "your" buyer rolls a sixsided die. If the numbers 1 and 2 turn up, the price deduction will be implemented. If the numbers 3, 4, 5, or 6 show up, the price deduction will not be implemented. We will indicate whether the price deduction -in case of an under-provision of quality -is due or not, by checking the respective box on your decision sheet. You will receive this information after you have determined your actual quality level. You now have all necessary information to calculate your own payoff as well as the payoff of "your" seller. This ends a trading day and the next one starts. In total there will be 12 trading days during which you can earn money.
